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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

COMMUNIQUE ON FAHMI VISIT CALLS DISENGAGEMENT FIRST STEP

The joint communique on Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's 21-24 January talks in Moscow reiterated the view earlier expressed by Gromyko that the disengagement agreement has "positive" significance, taking into account that it would be followed by a settlement based on Security Council resolutions. The sides urged an "early and effective" solution of the fundamental questions faced by the Geneva conference, and repeated the contention that peace could only be achieved through Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and respect for the Palestinians' legitimate rights. Brezhnev took the same line in his Havana rally speech on the 29th, calling the agreement a positive step but adding that the Geneva conference must achieve a political settlement and urging full implementation of UN decisions on the Middle East in the shortest possible time.

Brezhnev hinted at the need for a follow-up Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement in remarking that the present concord involved only one of the Arab countries which took part in the military action. And a PRAVDA commentator article on the 30th, as reviewed by TASS, gave Moscow's first although indirect endorsement of Syrian-Israeli disengagement negotiations in declaring that the problems of disengagement, as a "first step" toward the retrieval of all occupied Arab lands, "directly involved Syria."

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN
RELATIONS

Both the joint communique and surrounding comment on the Fahmi visit placed great emphasis on the importance of maintaining Soviet-Egyptian coordination and contacts in accordance with the spirit of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.* Indeed, in its

* The only other Soviet-Egyptian communique since the signing of the treaty which placed any particular emphasis on consultations was that on as-Sadat's October 1971 Moscow visit. The sides affirmed, in that document, the importance of regular contacts between leaders in accordance with the treaty and declared that they regarded such consultations as an important factor in strengthening their relations and in establishing peace in the Middle East.

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stress on this point, the communique seemed to reflect some Soviet irritation over the USSR's effective exclusion from the discussions of the military working group in Geneva as well as from the disengagement negotiations. It asserted that a "very important factor" for a just settlement was close coordination of Soviet and Egyptian actions "at all stages," and "in all the working bodies that may be formed" at the Geneva conference.

The same point was apparently underscored in a letter from Brezhnev to as-Sadat which, according to Cairo radio on the 24th, stressed the importance of contacts between Soviet and Egyptian leaders, "including personal contacts." The only available Soviet reference to the letter, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 25th, noted that an exchange of messages between Brezhnev and as-Sadat was the center of attention in Egyptian media. The Cairo press, it said, pointed out Brezhnev's "positive appreciation" of the disengagement agreement "which was the result of our two countries' joint efforts," which led to a change in the Middle East situation "compelling" Israel to participate in the Geneva conference.

Not surprisingly, the joint communique made no mention of any discussions concerning Soviet military aid during Fahmi's visit. In what might have been an oblique reference to the subject, the communique noted--as had Gromyko in his 22 January luncheon speech--that last October's events reaffirmed the "strength and durability" of Soviet-Egyptian friendship. The communique went on to affirm the sides' desire to develop and strengthen their mutual relations on the basis of the treaty. Somewhat more directly, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 24th declared that the treaty's effectiveness was apparent last October when "Soviet weapons and support" played an important role in guaranteeing the successes of the Egyptian and Syrian forces.

PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION

The communique formally supported Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference, calling for "full and equal" participation by Palestinian "representatives" in the nearest future. While it did not endorse the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by name, it seemed to suggest a separate Palestinian delegation rather than Palestinian representation in Jordan's delegation. Moscow had earlier noted, in a 6 January Arabic-language broadcast, that Cairo's AL-AHRAM had stated Egyptian support for PLO participation in the Geneva talks, and a brief 22 January domestic service report on as-Sadat's Algiers press conference said he favored Syrian and PLO participation at

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Geneva. TASS on the 24th reported an official Jordanian spokesman as saying that the Jordanian Government had accepted an invitation to the Geneva conference and had "consented to the participation of the PLO in its work."

SYRIA Brezhnev's hint in his Havana rally speech and the more explicit reference in the PRAVDA commentator article the following day constitute the strongest public indication to date that Moscow has decided to support the initiation of military disengagement negotiations between Syria and Israel. Heretofore, Moscow's only references to the Syrian issue had been brief reports of remarks that Kissinger and as-Sadat had made on the subject. While neither Brezhnev nor the PRAVDA article explicitly called for the beginning of Syrian-Israeli negotiations, both implied that this should be an early item on the agenda. The PRAVDA article, according to a TASS report, called the question of the retrieval of Syrian territories as "acute" as the retrieval of all occupied Arab lands.* It also stressed the importance of maintaining Arab unity, adding that the Soviet Union supported the "coordination of actions" of the Arab countries.

* In the only noted Soviet reference to Jordanian-Israeli talks, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 20 January reported the Jordanian premier as saying that Jordan and Israel would begin discussions in the near future on separating their forces along the Jordan River.

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ENERGY CRISIS

MOSCOW HITS WESTERN OIL MOVES, DEFENDS ARAB EMBARGO

An image of sharpening confrontation between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries has been conveyed by limited Moscow reportage and comment on the oil crisis over the past week. While Moscow still avoids authoritative comment on President Nixon's call for the Washington meeting of oil-consuming countries, low-level comment depicts the move as aimed against the Arabs. Reports that oil-consuming countries have sought to conclude bilateral deals with the Arabs have been briefly noted by Moscow in terms portraying such efforts as signs of distress in the capitalist economy.

Moscow has avoided comment on the details of various Western activities related to the energy crisis, but has conveyed a generally negative impression of Western moves by putting them in the framework of standard propaganda themes. TASS commentator Yevgeniy Kiselev wrote on 28 January, for example, that the meeting proposed by President Nixon represented a U.S. effort to create "a united front" of the major oil-consuming countries. He concluded that a failure of this move was predictable in the light of the refusal of Japan and West European countries to toe the U.S. line. Kiselev emphasized that the rush of the oil-consuming countries to conclude bilateral arrangements with the Arabs was further evidence of the contradictions that had arisen in the West.

Moscow has been similarly reserved about reporting recent developments in the Arab world. It has not acknowledged, for example, reports that Saudi Arabia may recommend to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries a lowering of oil prices, or that Egyptian President as-Sadat is advocating a lifting of the embargo. It has continued, however, to express generalized support for the Arabs' use of the oil weapon as a legitimate defense of national interests, often interpreting this in stereotyped ideological terms. An IZVESTIYA article on the 23d by political commentator Vikentiy Matveyev, for example, proclaimed that the energy crisis was a result of the general crisis of capitalism and the struggle of Third World countries to achieve "full economic liberation from imperialist dependence." Matveyev maintained that the nationalization of foreign property and the raising of oil prices were means to achieve this goal of independence. TASS commentator Bulantsev on the 25th refuted charges that the USSR had "masterminded" the oil embargo, asserting that the measure was a legitimate means

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employed by the Arabs to promote the removal of all Israeli troops from occupied Arab territory. Soviet oil expert and commentator Boris Rachkov warned in the first 1974 issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS that the "imperialist states" were trying to sow seeds of discord among the oil-producing states in an effort to end the oil embargo and increase the levels of oil production. He added that the "advocates of oil imperialism" were seriously concerned about the embargo because it could lead to widespread nationalization.

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SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

BREZHNEV PLEDGES SUPPORT FOR CUBA, CONTINUING U.S.-USSR DETENTE

According to initial TASS reports, a gala welcome was accorded Soviet leader Brezhnev on his 28 January arrival in Cuba for an "official friendly visit." In live coverage, Havana domestic television reported the reception accorded Brezhnev at the airport--where he was met by Cuban Premier Castro, President Dorticos and other Cuban officials--and the motorcade into Havana. The following day a mass rally was held in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, where, according to TASS accounts, more than one million people heard Castro and Brezhnev deliver speeches, also carried live by Havana television.

In his speech, Brezhnev paid due deference to the achievements of the "island of freedom" and, citing Soviet economic and military aid, stated that the CPSU and Soviet Government attach "prime importance" to deepening Soviet-Cuban relations, which are being developed on a "long-term basis."

Touching on various international issues, the Soviet leader referred to the Soviet-U.S. agreement on prevention of nuclear war and the summit talks held last June, and said that the process of normalizing Soviet-U.S. relations was a significant factor in bringing about positive changes in international affairs. He stressed that this process had helped to achieve important goals of the socialist countries, and that the improvement in Soviet-American relations was "profitable to the entire world." At the same time he reassured his Cuban allies that the Soviet people have always considered solidarity and support for Cuba a "sacred duty."

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INDOCHINA

FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH ASSESSES PEACE ACCORD ON ANNIVERSARY

The first anniversary of the 27 January 1973 Paris peace agreement prompted standard reaffirmations of support for the accord and warnings of the consequences of U.S. and Saigon failure to comply. These assessments appeared in PRG and DRV government statements, issued on the 24th and 25th respectively, in remarks at a Hanoi rally on the 28th by Xuan Thuy, chief DRV delegate at the four-party Paris peace talks, and in interviews with Le Duc Tho, special adviser to the Paris talks, and with DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. A less conventional assessment of the post-agreement situation, however, was offered in an article by Trinh, published in the January issue of the party journal HOC TAP which went beyond other comment in drawing broad lessons for future policy from the experience of the past year.

NGUYEN DUY TRINH
ARTICLE IN HOC TAP

The anniversary article by Trinh, which was broadcast by Hanoi radio's domestic service beginning on 28 January, in general viewed the pursuit of communist objectives in the South in sober terms: he warned of a long and difficult struggle to reach communist goals, stressed that the political struggle must be pressed along with military counterattacks, and exhibited undiminished distress over alleged Washington efforts to undermine Hanoi's relations with its allies. Trinh's last previous article in HOC TAP, published in October 1971, had expressed confidence that U.S. efforts to split the communist world had not succeeded and thus set the stage for the temporary halt, at that time, of the bitter DRV attacks on Peking which had followed the July 1971 announcement of President Nixon's plans to visit China. The 1971 article gave unusual stress to the important role of diplomatic efforts, along with military and political struggle, and may have reflected Hanoi's moves to prepare diplomatic initiatives to accompany the offensive which was launched in the South some five months later.

Citing tasks for the people in all of Vietnam, Trinh's current article called for maintaining a lasting peace, accelerating the socialist revolution in the North, completing the national democratic revolution in the South, and advancing toward peaceful reunification and the preservation of peace in the area and the world. He contended that the struggle to maintain peace and implement the agreement must be "conducted in a

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fierce, arduous, and complex manner," in the face of the intransigence of the United States and Saigon. Underlining this severe assessment, he added that "one must realize" that, "although the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys are in a defeated and weakened position, they still have forces available and are very stubbornly using them to oppose our people. Therefore, the southern revolution will inevitably be a long process of struggle over a winding, tortuous road before advancing to total victory."

While endorsing the necessity of the policy of inflicting appropriate military counterblows in the South to contain Saigon's forces, Trinh stressed the importance of the use of political struggle as well. Noting that political, military, and diplomatic struggles must be coordinated, he maintained that political struggle has "assumed considerable significance" in the wake of the peace agreement. He went on to claim that political struggle, along with military and diplomatic struggles, "can repel and frustrate the enemy's military, political, and diplomatic maneuvers" and that "our southern people attach great importance to the political struggle."

Trinh's stress on political struggle is not typical of propaganda in recent months and may reflect a new communist effort to draft policies to deal with the problem of building their political forces in the South. By contrast, propaganda for at least six months, particularly articles in the monthly military journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, has appeared to reflect elaborate, long-range efforts already underway to improve the communist military forces. While these articles focus on the preparation of an army for large-scale military campaigns, they do not--unlike articles for more than a year before the 1972 military offensive--press the need to launch such campaigns.*

Going beyond the standard litany of complaints against U.S. actions raised in other anniversary comment, Trinh assailed Washington for attempting to isolate Hanoi from its international

* Since June 1973 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN has carried articles each month discussing in great detail all aspects of preparing and launching large-scale military campaigns. The December journal included excerpts from a speech on this topic by North Vietnamese Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung, also published in the daily army paper on 16 and 17 December. Some of the earlier articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 7 November 1973, page 14.

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allies. According to Trinh, the United States is using a policy of "balance of power among the great powers and crafty political, diplomatic, and economic tricks" in an attempt to "separate our people from forces advocating peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism" and to "check the development of the Vietnamese revolution." He particularly reiterated concern about the DRV's communist allies. in charging that Washington is "taking advantage of the 'detente' label in the hope of dividing the socialist countries and the national liberation movement" Trinh also laid stress on the importance of unity among the people in Indochina and warned that here too Washington is attempting to divide the peoples of the three countries, attempting to "revive old national prejudices . . . in the hope of implementing the 'divide and rule' policy of pitting Indochinese against Indochinese."

GOVERNMENT
STATEMENTS

The government statements, like earlier white books issued by the DRV and PRG foreign ministries in advance of the anniversary, maintained routinely that the signing of the Paris agreement was a "great victory" for the Vietnamese people and that the absence of peace in Vietnam resulted from U.S. and Saigon failure to live up to its provisions.* Both stressed U.S. responsibility for implementation of the accords, but with the PRG taking the lead in this regard. The PRG statement explicitly took issue with President Nixon's assertion that the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam "does not mean any change in the interests of the United States, but only in the way to achieve them," and claimed that this attitude is "the deep root and direct cause of the current critical situation in South Vietnam." The DRV statement in making a similar contention avoided any mention of the President. Similarly, only the PRG statement warned that continuing "acts of war and the obstinate attitude of the United States and Saigon have created a very serious tension in South Vietnam threatening the total implementation of the Paris agreement."

Hanoi's statement routinely condemned the United States for alleged aerial reconnaissance over the DRV and euphemistically acknowledged the absence of U.S. aid when it complained about attempts to "elude its obligations to heal the wounds of war"

* The DRV and PRG white papers, issued on 17 and 22 January respectively, are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 16-18.

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in the North. The statement also assailed "many responsible personalities in the U.S. ruling circles" for making "threats" against the Vietnamese people. It reiterated the standard contention that "normalization" of U.S.-DRV relations must be based on "scrupulous" U.S. implementation of the Paris agreement.

LE DUC THO
INTERVIEW

In his 26 January interview, Le Duc Tho assessed the current situation in South Vietnam in standard terms, charging that it is "becoming increasingly serious" because of U.S. and Saigon actions. To cope with this, he declared that the Vietnamese people have "no other choice" than to "resolutely and most appropriately deal counterblows," adding that they must be closely coordinated with the "struggle on the political and diplomatic fronts." Tho offered "two paths" to the United States, stating that it can "scrupulously" implement the agreement and establish "normal" relations with the DRV or it can continue to violate the accord and suffer "total defeat." In a 24 December French television interview after his Paris meeting with Kissinger, Tho had similarly described the paths open to the United States but had gone on to express the hope that the United States would opt for implementation of the accord.

Tho clearly reflected Hanoi's continuing concentration on domestic problems in responding to a question about current tasks facing the Vietnamese. He led off with the need to "improve our awareness of collective ownership," an ideological lesson which Hanoi has been trying to bring home in its campaigns in recent months to end wasteful or illegal use of materials and poor labor productivity. In addition, Tho called for emulation movements to overcome difficulties and "quickly heal the wounds of war, intensively restore and develop the economy, accelerate the building of the material-technical bases of socialism, consolidate the socialist production relationship," and improve the people's livelihood. In last place he took note of the tasks of "intensifying the consolidation of national defense and the maintenance of security" and of "serving as a firm and stable support for the revolutionary struggle in the South." Outlining these same tasks at a 12 January awards meeting in Hanoi, Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi had described them as "urgent tasks" for the North in both 1974 and 1975.

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PEKING AND MOSCOW COMMENT ON PARIS AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY

CHINA Continuing its low posture on Vietnam developments, Peking marked the anniversary of the Paris accord with a 27 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that softpedaled criticism of the United States in a standard fashion and diluted past expressions of Chinese support for Vietnam. The editorial echoed Peking's Vietnamese allies in contrasting "two diametrically opposed attitudes" toward the peace accord, but it cited only Saigon as opposing the correct posture of Hanoi and the PRG. PEOPLE'S DAILY incidentally criticized the United States as a source of support and encouragement to Saigon and for allegedly leaving military personnel in South Vietnam. However, even this criticism was balanced by the editorial's citing of steps the United States had taken to implement the agreement and its comment that they were "conducive to improving the situation in Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

Like the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial last year marking the signing of the accord, the current editorial advised of difficulties in bringing the agreement to complete fruition, warning this time that an "acute and complex struggle" lies ahead. But in contrast to last year's pledge of continued Chinese support and demand for strict U.S.-Saigon implementation, the editorial limited itself to expressing confidence that the Vietnamese would overcome all remaining obstacles.

USSR Moscow gave low-level attention to the Paris agreement anniversary, including articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA and a meeting of workers in Moscow addressed by the DRV ambassador. The 27 January PRAVDA article observed that the Paris agreement "largely promoted further improvement of the general political climate in the international scene" and "consolidated" the position of the "patriotic forces" in Indochina. As reported by TASS, the article went on to criticize Washington's support for Saigon and to note that U.S. aid for the GVN and the statements of U.S. officials raising the possibility of renewed U.S. bombing were not helping to "normalize the situation in South Vietnam." The IZVESTIYA article, as reported by TASS, focused on Saigon's alleged hampering of the accord, observing only in passing that "a great share of responsibility for this situation rests with the U.S. military-industrial complex, which is encouraging the Saigon Administration in its provocative activities."

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USSR - JAPAN

MOSCOW WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FOLLOWING PRC LINE ON RELATIONS

Recent Soviet comment has warned Japan in unusually direct terms not to allow its developing relations with the USSR to be endangered by the expanding ties with China and China's support for the return to Japan of Soviet-held islands.

An 18 January NEW TIMES article by N. Nikolayev warned Japanese leaders not to allow "the Peking leadership" to interfere in questions concerning the Soviet Union and Japan. He attacked Peking's thesis that the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute demonstrates the need for joint Sino-Japanese efforts to defend their territorial claims against a threat from "the North." Moscow's recent turn towards a more explicit counterattack on Peking appears to be in response to an ongoing Peking campaign portraying the USSR as a common threat to the "territorial rights" of both China and Japan. This theme has been exploited by Peking extensively since the time of Prime Minister Tanaka's Moscow visit last October.* For example, NCNA on 23 January publicized an article from a Japanese journal so as to suggest that the Japanese viewed Soviet missile tests timed just before Tanaka's visit as "military intimidation" aimed at the Japanese-Soviet summit talks.

Moscow had at first withheld all comment on the sensitive territorial question in the immediate aftermath of Tanaka's Moscow visit but resumed attention to the issue later in the year. An unusually frank 22 January PRAVDA commentary by I. Latyshev criticized the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for urging a massive public campaign for return of the disputed islands. Latyshev argued that a recent LDP policy paper had lost its sense of reality when it claimed "that a policy of making territorial demands on the Soviet Union could insure success for the Soviet-Japanese talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty."

By focusing public attention on its territorial dispute with Japan at this time, Moscow appears to be telling the LDP that progress on the sensitive territorial issue will

* For background on this theme, see the 14 November 1974 TRENDS, pages 28-29.

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come only if Japan succeeds in steering a diplomatic course away from the line advocated by Peking. A Moscow radio commentary on 24 January, for example, recalled that it had been agreed during Tanaka's Moscow visit that new negotiations to conclude a peace treaty would be held in 1974, and asserted that "if the two sides are sincere in their motives and are willing, all issues in dispute will find solution." Tanaka has publicly insisted that all four Soviet-held islands must be returned before a peace treaty is signed.

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U S S R

CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN DEVELOPS GRADUALLY

The campaign against Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the wake of the foreign publication of his controversial book "Gulag Archipelago" has developed gradually through a series of sharp but carefully measured assaults, but it has yet to reach the intensity of the concentrated attacks last fall on Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. While the earlier campaign consisted of a 10-day barrage of individual and collective letters of protest from members of various Soviet professional groups published in the central and local press, the current campaign involves sporadic attacks spread over a period of a month and the publication of individual rather than collective letters of protest. PRAVDA and the literary newspapers SOVIET CULTURE and LITERARY GAZETTE have virtually monopolized the current campaign, whereas in the earlier one other central and local papers participated.

As in the campaign last fall, Solzhenitsyn has been vilified as a tool of Western propaganda and an enemy of detente in a continuing series of commentaries broadcast for foreign audiences. These charges have been sharply amplified in domestic commentary designed to discredit Solzhenitsyn, arouse public indignation against him, and appeal to patriotic sentiments, without at the same time revealing much of the actual content of his book. By contrast, the campaign against Sakharov exposed many of Sakharov's statements and arguments to the Soviet public. Insofar as the issue of Stalinist repression has been broached in comment, it has been treated in very general terms as a matter "long ago condemned and decisively corrected" by the regime. Apart from a few hints that the door to emigration is open to Solzhenitsyn and that he should not be allowed to become a martyr, the comment has given no indication of what fate is in store for him.

INITIAL STAGE The campaign began on 2 and 3 January with press releases and radio commentaries directed exclusively at foreign audiences. Attacks on domestic radio and TV commenced on 4 January, and two days later the central press began to publish reprints of attacks in foreign communist papers. The tone of domestic commentaries was set by Yuriy Zhukov during his 9 January

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TV program. Responding to letters about foreign radio broadcasts, Zhukov dismissed Solzhenitsyn's book as a malicious slander against the Soviet system and a crude attempt to revive the issue of "gross violations of legality" under Stalin which, he claimed, were "long ago condemned and decisively corrected" by the Soviet regime.

Although the press at this time avoided direct attacks on Solzhenitsyn, moves were made against his associates. The writer Lidiya Chukovskaya, who reportedly had made her home available to Solzhenitsyn, was expelled from the writers union on 9 January, and on 12 January SOVIET RUSSIA assailed Chukovskaya for sending her writings abroad. The article also attacked Michael Scammell, the British translator of Solzhenitsyn's book, for smuggling manuscripts out of the Soviet Union.

The first major direct assault on Solzhenitsyn and his writings in the central press appeared in PRAVDA on 14 January. Entitled the "Path of Betrayal" and published over the signature of I. Solovyov, the article labeled Solzhenitsyn a "traitor" and harshly attacked his book without revealing much of its controversial content. The article claimed that the Stalin era repressions had been officially condemned and that an acceptable body of literature criticizing those practices had appeared in the Soviet Union.

Solovyov's article was reprinted in all republic papers as well as in LITERARY GAZETTE, SOVIET CULTURE, SOVIET RUSSIA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and TRUD. Two days later PRAVDA carried a roundup of foreign reaction to the article that suggested widespread approval and opposition only by the "most reactionary organs of imperialist propaganda." For the next few days the central press carried similar reaction reports or reprints of foreign articles, leaving the main thrust of the campaign to the literary press.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On 16 January LITERARY GAZETTE printed an extensive assault on Solzhenitsyn and his writings, similar to the Solovyov article. In its next issue, on 23 January, the same paper ran criticism of Solzhenitsyn by RSFSR writers

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union head Sergey Mikhalkov, Belorussian writers union head Petrus Brovka, former Ukrainian writers union head Oles Honchar, Georgian writers union head Grigol Abashidze, and NOVY MIR deputy editor Oleg Smirnov. Paralleling these attacks, SOVIET CULTURE in its issues of 18, 22 and 25 January published letters by minor cultural figures backing Solovyov's charges.

During mid-January only a handful of the most conservative officials in the writers union attacked Solzhenitsyn in radio broadcasts; among these were Mikhalkov and his Ukrainian and Belorussian counterparts Vasil Kozachenko and Petrus Brovka, respectively, LITERARY GAZETTE editor Aleksandr Chakovskiy, and Yuriy Verchenko, a secretary of the national writers union. In a 14 January broadcast Mikhalkov suggested that Solzhenitsyn was free to leave the Soviet Union.

On 24 and 25 January the campaign picked up slightly as PRAVDA began publishing letters from writers, workers, peasants and war veterans responding to the Solovyov article. Among the letter writers were onetime NOVY MIR editor Konstantin Simonov, innovative theater director Georgiy Tovstonogov, and Rasul Gamzatov, a member of NOVY MIR's editorial board. Simonov complained that Solzhenitsyn's activities were becoming increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union. Tovstonogov stressed the enormous progress in overcoming the "negative phenomena of the past" and criticized Solzhenitsyn's book for playing into the hands of advocates of the cold war. Gamzatov notably repeated the offer of exile: "If Solzhenitsyn does not like our system. . .," he wrote, "let him go where he feels comfortable."

In late January, direct attacks on Solzhenitsyn appeared in other central newspapers. On 27 January KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA printed five critical letters by students, workers and soldiers, and on 29 January IZVESTIYA carried an attack by Lt. Gen. Pavel Zhilin, director of the Institute of Military History, on Solzhenitsyn's sympathetic portrayal of the most prominent Soviet wartime defector, General Vlasov. A Ukrainian paper, RADYANSKA UKRAINA, also began printing critical letters by prominent Ukrainian writers, composers, kolkhozniks and workers in its 25 and 26 January issues.

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CHINA

PEKING WARNS AGAINST CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF WESTERN MUSIC

Two recent PEOPLE'S DAILY articles have decried a tendency to uncritically accept Western music, extending into yet another sphere the campaign begun over a year ago to prevent the aftermath of the Lin Piao affair from undermining cultural revolution reforms. The articles on music state that Western symphonic music is "totally incompatible with the socialist system," note that "some people" are instilling such music into the minds of young people uncritically, and link this tendency to the "peaceful evolution" achieved by Soviet revisionists.

A 21 January PEOPLE'S DAILY article affirmed that the issue is no mere academic struggle, but a "major debate." The article linked the support for Western music to the "tendency to worship everything foreign" and warned that this tendency "is not confined to music circles." While the article unequivocally stated that it is impossible to shut off contact with foreign things, it set narrow limits in noting that "the purpose of such contact is confined only to the creation of our own art."

An earlier 14 January PEOPLE'S DAILY article on music had cited Chou En-lai's 10th party congress remarks on cultural struggle as authority for resisting the "comeback of the revisionist sinister line on literature and art," but the articles on music and other recent cultural activities seem to reflect well-known views of Chiang Ching as well. While Peking domestic media have not openly credited Chiang Ching with achievements on the cultural front since May 1973, she was often previously praised for implementing precisely the policies advocated by the two PEOPLE'S DAILY articles.

The linkage between Chiang and policies now being praised was explicit in an interview with pianist Yin Cheng-chung, carried on 27 December by NCNA English but not publicized in domestic media. Yin praised Chiang's leadership in producing the "Yellow River Concerto" and credited Chiang for proclaiming the need to revolutionize instrumental music and for stating that China must "break with foreign conventions and go its own way." Yin illustrated the need for selective cultural borrowing rather than wholesale adoption with an anecdote describing worker reaction to a new revolutionary piano tune; previously when they had heard the piano used to play foreign bourgeois music they had not enjoyed it, but when it was used to play revolutionary Chinese tunes they realized that it was also built by workers and could be enjoyed.

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MOSCOW ON PEKING'S IRREDENTISM: Moscow has been devoting greater attention to a wide range of territorial issues involving Peking as the Sino-Soviet polemic has heated up and Soviet pressure for an Asian security pact has increased. Most recently, Moscow has seized upon Peking's clash with South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands to highlight Peking's alleged irredentist tendencies to the south and its willingness to use force to back its aspirations. A TASS dispatch of 26 January, carried in PRAVDA the next day, quoted the JAPAN TIMES as saying that Peking had "shown its aggressive claws and clearly intimated that it is ready to use armed force in order to assert itself on the territories it claims." The dispatch went on to quote the INDIAN EXPRESS on the "fear" engendered in the Philippines, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries by the Chinese actions in the Paracels. Reporting Indian reaction, TASS added that "as noted here in this context, it is becoming increasingly obvious why the PRC is so hostile to the creation of a system of collective security in Asia whose goal is the solution of all disputes by peaceful means." On 25 January TASS reported a Japanese government statement reasserting Tokyo's claim to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea "in connection with the PRC's claims," and subsequent radio commentary has accused China of sinister designs in this region as well. TASS commentator Mikhail Yakovlev on the 26th said that Peking needed "an increase in tension on its northern, western, and now its southern borders, in order to divert the Chinese people's attention from internal difficulties."

Moscow has avoided any direct suggestion that Peking's actions in the Paracels are cause for new concern on the Sino-Soviet border. However, the 27 January domestic radio roundtable on international affairs hinted at such a possibility. Reiterating a thesis that has emerged in other commentary recently, IZVESTIYA commentator Vikentiy Matveyev drew attention to signs that a new cultural revolution may be imminent in China and went on to observe that "it was at the height of this [earlier] cultural revolution that the Chinese military undertook armed provocations on our borders."

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CEMA ANNIVERSARY: A lengthy PRAVDA editorial article on 23 January marking CEMA's 25th anniversary hailed the expansion of its membership since its inception, while at the same time conceding "difficulties" in achieving economic integration. The difficulties were attributed to geographical remoteness--an allusion to the relatively recent entry of Cuba and Mongolia into the fold--and to the diversities in size, historical background, and economic development of the member countries. The article singled out Yugoslavia's increasing participation in the organization and noted the role of the DRV and DPRK, occasionally listed as meeting "observers," in the work of "some" CEMA bodies. The article concluded with an appeal--consistent with the line of the Crimea conference of bloc party leaders last July--for unity among the communist parties of socialist countries. A Bucharest SCINTEIA editorial on the 25th commemorated the occasion by stressing that Romania would increase economic cooperation with "all" socialist states and "all" countries regardless of social system, thereby serving notice of Bucharest's continued insistence on national independence and sovereignty.

WEST EUROPEAN CP SUMMIT: A Brussels conference of West European communist parties from 26 to 28 January produced predictable broadides of propaganda in favor of Moscow's foreign policy positions, as well as occasional displays of national party differences over such issues as the treatment of China and the calling of a world communist party conference. According to TASS reports on the proceedings, French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais sharply attacked the Chinese leadership for supporting "big imperialist bourgeoisie" positions, which he alleged illustrated China's "abandonment" of proletarian internationalism. By contrast, Italian party leader Enrico Berlinguer refrained from publicly criticizing the Chinese leaders. West German party chairman Herbert Mies reiterated his earlier calls for an all-European as well as a world conference of communist parties, stressing that "the moment has come when preparations should start" for the world conference. Moscow briefly reported on the communique issued as well as a "joint declaration" which said, among other things, that detente created a favorable situation for strengthening the left alliance in West Europe. TASS also noted that statements of solidarity with Vietnam and Chile and a resolution on the energy crisis were adopted by the conference.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 JANUARY 1974

<u>Moscow (2650 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1174 items)</u>		
Brezhnev Cuban Visit	(4%)	15%	Domestic Issues	(54%)	49%
Lenin 50th Death Anniversary	(7%)	9%	Vietnam	(4%)	16%
China	(6%)	8%	[Paracel Islands Dispute]	(2%)	7%]
[PRC Expulsion of Soviet Diplomats]	(--)	4%]	[Paris Agreement Anniversary]	(--)	5%]
Middle East	(2%)	7%	PRC Expulsion of Soviet Diplomats	(2%)	11%
[Egyptian Foreign Minister in USSR]	(--)	5%]	PRC Foreign Ministry Note on USSR	(--)	3%
Indian National Day	(--)	3%	Expulsion of PRC Diplomat		
CEMA 25th Anniversary	(1%)	3%			
Attacks on Solzhenitsyn	(4%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.